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BUDGETING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY:  
A WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE 
Douglas A. Brook* 
 
ABSTRACT.  There is a current argument that “national security” and 
“national defense” are no longer synonymous terms—that there is a new and 
broader definition for the activities that contribute to “the common defense.”  
A whole of government approach is suggested as a means for integrating 
and coordinating national security policies and programs.  To support this 
approach, recommendations have been made for an integrated national 
security budget. Focusing on the executive budget process, three 
approaches to an integrated national security budget are examined: 
organization-based, program-based and function-based. Though there are 
questions about the importance of budget structure and the effectiveness of 
program budgeting, a whole of government integrated unified national 
security budget could facilitate the fiscal trade-offs required between 
alternative means of pursuing national security objectives in the executive 
budget. 
INTRODUCTION1 
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution says, in part: 
The Congress shall have Power To […] provide for the 
common Defense and general Welfare of the United States; 
[...]. To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of 
Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; 
To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the 
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces […]. 
------------------------------ 
* Douglas A. Brook, Ph.D. is Professor of Public Policy and Director of the 
Center for Defense Management Research, Naval Postgraduate School. His 
research interests are in public budgeting, defense financial management 
and public management. 
 
 
Copyright © 2012 by PrAcademics Press 
BUDGETING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY: A WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT PERSPECTIVE 33 
 
But the Constitution provides no guidance for how much the United 
States should spend for the common defense.  In fact, the 
Constitution says nothing about budgeting at all nor does it provide 
any further definition for what constitutes the “common defense.”  
Over the years, it has become easy to think of the common defense 
as consisting of the activities of the Department of Defense (DoD) 
and to equate spending for the common defense with the budget for 
DoD.  However, there is a current argument that “national security” 
and “national defense” are no longer synonymous terms—that there 
is a new and broader definition for the activities that contribute to 
“the common defense.”  If so, a change is required in thinking about 
what constitutes national security activity and in determining what 
the US investment in national security is and should be.  
National Defense versus National Security 
This issue of national defense vs. national security arises 
because DoD-centric national defense may not adequately describe 
the broad security needs of current circumstances. National defense 
tends to ignore those non-military national security activities involved 
in confronting the non-state/non-traditional threats that exist today. 
Air Force General Kevin P. Chilton (2003), Commander US Strategic 
Command, described this complex new global security environment 
as characterized by the following: 
- Population changes, competition for increasingly scarce natural 
resources, economic struggles, and bids for regional and global 
power, 
- Technology where a few well-placed computer keystrokes today 
can potentially match the impact of earlier generations’ armed 
forces—for good or ill.   
The acting Comptroller General seems to agree. 
The new threats are diffuse and ambiguous and include 
terrorist threats from extremist groups, cyber attacks, 
drug trafficking, infectious diseases, and energy threats. 
They arise from multiple sources and are interrelated, 
which makes it difficult, if not impossible for any single 
agency to effectively address them alone (Dodaro, 2010, 
p. 19). 
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The idea of incorporating non-military activities into the US 
government’s operational definition of national security predates 
9/11. For example, in 1993 President Clinton expanded the scope of 
the National Security Council (NSC) to include a range of non-military 
security issues such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, environmental 
degradation, rapid population growth and refugee flows (The White 
House, 2010 September). In 2004, the Bush Administration 
attempted to address the non-military post-conflict aspects of the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with the creation of the Office of the 
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) within the 
State Department.  S/CRS was intended to promote better consensus 
and collaboration across government agencies, and to draw expertise 
and resources from multiple agencies (Office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2004).  
Non-military roles in national security might be more the mission 
of agencies like the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the State Department, Treasury or even the Department of 
Commerce. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has said that lessons 
learned in recent operations stress the critical need to develop more 
deployable civilian expertise for conducting stabilization, 
reconstruction, and counterinsurgency operations (Department of 
Defense, 2008). DoD’s newest Quadrennial Roles and Missions 
Review Report recognizes the need to explore whole-of-government 
strategies to national security and argues for better coordination of 
resources, strategy and mission between civilian and military 
agencies: “The Department strongly supports initiatives to increase 
unity of effort across the government for addressing our common 
national security problems” (DoD, 2009, p. 31). 
The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), commissioned in 
the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, argued that the pre-
9/11 and Cold War-era concept of national defense is outdated and 
does not ensure national security: “[O]ur national security challenges 
require effective whole-of-government integration, but we remain 
dominated by outmoded, inward-looking, vertically oriented, 
competitive, stove-piped bureaucracies” (Locher, 2009). PNSR’s 
report recommended the US focus on integrating efforts across the 
many departments and agencies that contribute to national security.  
Finally, President Obama’s FY 2011 budget listed nine national 
security objectives other than military-related.  The FY ’11 budget 
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then identified $719 billion in total security spending including parts 
or all of DoD, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland 
Security, Department of Veterans Affairs, Department of State and 
other international programs (US Office of Management and Budget, 
2010). 
Whole of Government 
Pollitt (Christensen & Laegreid, 2008) defined whole of 
government to “denote the aspiration to achieve horizontal and 
vertical coordination in order to eliminate situations in which different 
policies undermine each other, so as to make better use of scarce 
resources, to create synergies by bringing together different 
stakeholders in a particular policy area, and to offer citizens seamless 
rather than fragmented access to services” (p.98). Whole of 
government can refer to cooperation between agencies within a 
single government or cooperation among levels of government. Whole 
of government reforms are generally seen as “conscious 
organizational design or reorganization” that call for political leaders 
to force cooperation between bureaucracies (Christensen & Lægreid, 
2006, p. 9). The whole of government redesign attempts to shift 
existing bureaucratic structures in a way that forces collaboration and 
cooperation between agencies. 
Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom have each adopted 
whole of government approaches.  The Australian government 
determined that in focusing on defense, its national security 
strategies and policies were too narrowly drawn toward conventional 
military threats—a focus that did not protect against emerging non-
traditional threats (see Swinsburg, 2001; Warner, 2004). The 
government redefined defense to national security, recognizing non-
military vulnerabilities such as economic prosperity, diplomacy, 
national welfare, climate change, energy, infrastructure, industry and 
the general nature of Australian society. A white paper from the 
Australia Ministry of Defence (2004) concluded “we should rethink 
what we mean by security, develop different relationships with 
regional states, reassess the weapons systems required to satisfy our 
security interests, and increase aid to our Asia-Pacific neighbors” 
(p.1).  
Accordingly, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, Australia 
restructured its national security governance to accommodate the 
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whole of government approach. The Australian National Security 
Committee of Cabinet (NSCC) became the government’s highest 
decision- making body on national security. The NSCC is chaired by 
the Prime Minister, and consists of the Deputy Prime Minister, 
Foreign Minister, Defense Minister, Treasurer, Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs and the 
Attorney-General.  
Canada’s model of whole of government was introduced 
in Canada's Performance 2002 (Treasury Board of Canada 
Secretariat, 2007). It maps the contributions of departments, 
agencies and Crown corporations that receive appropriations to a set 
of high-level Government of Canada outcome areas. The whole of 
government framework is designed to improve reporting to 
Parliament on overall spending, performance, and planning 
information for high-level priorities on which multiple departments are 
working towards related outcomes. Each department or agency 
involved in a major government program must account for how it will 
align its activities with the Government program and must gain 
approval by the Treasury Board.  Funds are allocated to agencies 
based on their contributions to specific government-wide programs.   
In the UK, a 1999 white paper, Modernising Government, “called 
for the public sector to work in partnership across organisational 
boundaries, to provide more integrated and seamless service 
delivery.  This has resulted in reviews of spending across 
governmental organizations, creation of cross-cutting governmental 
units, and an acceptance of horizontal approaches to government 
programs” (State Government of Victoria State Services Authority, 
2007, p. 10).  
The 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy called for a whole of 
government approach to “strengthening national capacity” in the 
following areas: defense, diplomacy, economic, development, 
homeland security, intelligence, strategic communications, and the 
American people and the private sector (The White House, 2010, 
May, pp. 14–16). 
A Whole of Government Approach to US National Security Policy 
Three themes can be discerned in the arguments for a whole of 
government approach to US national security.  The first theme is that 
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the existing system is out-of-date. The US now faces a number of non-
traditional threats against which the existing system is challenged to 
defend.  “Stove piped” bureaucracies are unable to collaborate 
adequately against these modern threats.  A whole of government 
national security system, it is argued, would foster collaboration and a 
better defense against modern threats.  General Chilton (2009) p. 3  
argued, “effective, modern deterrence requires a complex global 
understanding and the elegant execution of coordinated, whole of 
government options to meet today’s broad security challenges” (p. 3).  
The second theme is that the State Department and other civilian 
security-related agencies are underfunded.  O’Hanlon (2009) argued 
that a whole of government system for national security should 
incorporate DoD, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 
State Department and foreign operations in other departments.  He 
argued for increases in State and DHS budgets to account for 
decades of underfunding and contended that these non-Defense 
agency/department budgets have not changed to reflect current 
security threats (p. 5). Secretary Gates (DoD October 16, 2009) has 
said that “the reality is the Department of State and the Agency for 
International Development were starved for resources for decades” 
(p. 3). Gates (2007) has also argued, “What is clear to me is that 
there is a need for a dramatic increase in spending on the civilian 
instruments of national security—diplomacy, strategic 
communications, foreign assistance, civic action, and economic 
reconstruction and development” (p. 4). 
The third theme is that current organizational designs sub-
optimize coordination for national security. The separation of the 
National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council created 
an organizational divide between national security and homeland 
defense. In addition, there needs to be a unified security council in 
which other relevant civilian agencies are represented. National 
Security Advisor General James Jones (2009) said, “The whole 
concept of what constitutes the membership of the national security 
community—which, historically has been […] the Defense Department, 
the NSC itself and a little bit of the State Department, to the exclusion 
perhaps of the Energy Department, Commerce Department and 
Treasury, all the law enforcement agencies, the Drug Enforcement 
Administration […]—has got to embrace a broader membership” 
(deYoung, 2009, p. 1). Similarly, the acting Comptroller General 
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asserts, “Beyond the traditional agencies of the Departments of 
Defense and State, and the U.S Agency for International 
Development, the Departments of Homeland Security, Energy, 
Justice, the Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, and Health and Human 
Services are now a bigger part of the equation” (Dodaro, 2010, p. 
19). 
Budgeting for National Security 
 GAO’s Dodaro (2010) observed “what has not yet evolved are the 
mechanisms that agencies use to coordinate national security 
activities […]. In the absence of effective mechanisms, collaboration 
suffers and in some cases can be a hindrance to achieving national 
security objectives” (p. 19). How can the question of building a whole 
of government national security model be addressed?  One choice 
might be to address organizational and structural issues. It has been 
suggested that the National Security Council (NSC) and Homeland 
Security Council (HSC) could be merged (Project on National Security 
Reform, 2008). The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) 
(2008, pp. (pp. xi–xiv) made a number of structural and procedural 
recommendations, including: 
- Establish a President’s Security Council to replace the National 
Security Council and Homeland Security Council. 
- Create a Director for National Security in the Executive Office of 
the President. 
- Build an interagency personnel system, including a National 
Security Professional Corps. 
- Form Select Committees on National Security in the Senate and 
House of Representatives. 
In fact, the Obama administration has taken steps in this 
direction by integrating the staffs supporting national security 
and homeland security into a new “National Security Staff” 
under the president’s national security advisor (The White 
House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2009). In addition, DoD 
(2009) “supports the development of a whole of government 
strategic planning document that outlines national objectives, 
priorities and specific actions for improving interagency 
coordination and operational planning” (p. 31). 
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A second or supporting step would be to build a national security 
budget. The PNSR (2008, p. 49) made a recommendation in this area 
as well: “Develop the capability to produce an integrated national 
security budget.” 
The Center for American Progress made three budget-related 
recommendations: 
- Create a unified national security budget for fiscal year 2011 and 
mandate its development every fiscal year. 
- Submit a defense appropriation bill and foreign operations bill 
concurrently to Congress. 
- Create a “Unified Security Funding Analysis” in the Office of 
Management and Budget’s analytical perspectives document 
(Korb, Duggan, & Conley, 2009, p. 38). 
The Center argued for a reorientation of the national security 
budget to drive resources to non-military security agencies and 
activities and they called for a unified national security budget.  
Critical to this effort is the need to create a unified national 
security budget that would enable policymakers to more 
readily recognize and evaluate the difficult trade-offs between 
the offensive (military forces), defensive (homeland security), 
and preventative (non-military international engagement, 
including diplomacy, nonproliferation, foreign aid, 
peacekeeping intelligence, and contributions to international 
organizations) aspects of American national power (Korb et 
al., p. 37). 
DoD seemed also to see the need for a coordinated funding 
mechanism. “Funding and authorities dedicated solely to individual 
agencies may not be sufficient to ensure that the activities of multiple 
agencies are fully integrated […]. The Department recognizes the 
need for authorities and approaches to funding for whole of 
government operations” (DoD, 2009, pp. 35–36). 
METHODS 
Calls for a more holistic approach to national security and a 
supporting national security budget structure invite a review of 
relevant theories of public budgeting and an examination of the 
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practices of federal executive budgeting to explore how calls for a 
new approach to national security policymaking and budgeting might 
be accomplished. In this paper, we identify applicable theories and 
frameworks for public budgeting as they relate to policymaking, 
resultant resource allocation decisions, and program management 
and oversight. Secondly, we examine the practice of executive 
budgeting in the U.S, federal government focusing on program 
budgeting and the use of budget functions. Finally, we construct 
various alternative national security budgets using data from the 
fiscal 2008 president’s budget and the annual performance reports 
of the major government agencies and departments. 
Budget Structure, Program Budgets and Budget Reform 
Why would budgets be an appropriate lens through which to view 
the national defense versus national security question? Certainly, 
budget theorists have identified a number of relevant roles of public 
budgets, including setting goals and priorities, making choices among 
alternatives, linking goals to actions, translating resources into 
activities, aligning stakeholders, setting expectations, creating 
expectations, and setting work plans. Budgets are seen as tools for 
coordination and control and as a basis for administration in 
departments and agencies. (See Khan & Hildreth, 2002; Nice, 2002; 
Rubin, 1988; Wildavsky, 1988; Wildavsky & Caiden, 2004.)  
In addition to these general characteristics of public budgeting, 
advocates of national security budgets seem to be making two 
arguments: first, that budget structure matters somehow; and 
second, that budgeting based on national security programs will 
facilitate better decision making. The focus is on the executive 
budget, consistent with Schick’s observation, “In the modern genesis 
of budgeting, efforts to improve planning, management and control 
made common cause under the popular banner of the executive 
budget concept. In the goals and lexicon of first reformers, budgeting 
meant executive budgeting” (Schick, 1966, p. 246). Arguments for a 
reformed national security budget are essentially arguments for a sort 
of program budgeting, confident that budget structure and format can 
affect budget outcomes. 
The literature on budget structure and program budgeting offers a 
mixed view of the effects on budgetary outcomes.  Budget structure 
consequences for decision making was perhaps most strongly made 
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in connection with program budgeting, specifically regarding the 
planning programming budget system (PBB). “The case for PPB rests 
on the assumption that the form in which information is classified 
and used governs the actions of budgetmakers, and conversely, that 
alterations in form will produce desired changes in behavior” (Schick, 
1966, p. 244). Grizzle (1986) examined the effects of budget 
formats, envisioning a two-step process where budget format affects 
the nature of budget review discourse, which in turn affects the 
nature of legislative appropriations. Grizzle (1986) found “that format 
is […] an important factor influencing the nature of budgetary 
deliberations” (p. 61) concluding that format was not determinative of 
legislative outcomes but did “influence ‘what the conversation was 
about’ during the legislatures’ review of proposed state budgets” (pp. 
67–68).  
Arguments that national security budgets will make for better 
resource allocation decision making are essentially arguments for 
program budgeting. “[Program budgeting] undertakes to use the 
budget process for analyzing objectives and the future consequences 
of alternative programs available for achieving them. It is, in essence, 
a decision-making process to determine, first, objectives, then 
programs, to be used in achieving the objectives, and, finally, the 
amounts of available resources to be allocated among the various 
programs” (Novick, 1973, p. vii). An essential element of the national 
security program budget would be to aggregate national security 
spending across the government and make decisions between 
alternative means of achieving national security goals. “One of the 
strengths of program budgeting is that it cuts across organizational 
boundaries. […] Contradictions are more likely to be recognized and a 
context is supplied for consideration of changes made possible only 
by cutting across existing agency lines” (Novick, 1973, p. 6). If so, 
trade-offs ought to be possible and program cost and performance 
should become visible. “The program budget […] provide[s] a 
framework for more clearly defining the alternatives among which 
choices must be made and create[s] an information system that will 
assist in measuring costs in relation to accomplishments” (Anshen, 
1969, p. 18). Similarly, overlap and redundancies should become 
apparent; “One of the characteristics of better decisions will be 
identification and possible removal of overlapping and redundant 
activities. Another will be exposure of ineffective or inefficient 
employment of resources. A third will be brighter illumination of the 
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long-range cost implications” (McKean & Anshelm, 1965, p. 236). 
Choices among alternatives are, however, highly dependent upon 
getting the new budget structure right. “An important criterion for a 
program structure is that it should permit comparison of alternative 
methods of pursuing an imperfectly determined policy objective. Even 
though objectives may be clearly defined, there usually are 
alternative ways of accomplishing them” (Smithies, 1969, p. 42). 
Program budgeting does not require government reorganization. 
“The program budget system is not a reorganization plan nor does it 
seek or require changes in organization to fit the structure” (Novick, 
1973, p. 13). While the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
might deal with different arrays of budget data, “the same budget 
design […] serves both the decision and implementation objectives. 
[…] Thus a revision of the budget submittal and decision structure 
would not require an accompanying reorganization of the executive 
departments” (Anshen, 1969, p. 3). 
Notwithstanding these arguments, the history of budget reform 
suggests achieving the desired outcomes has been difficult. 
After 150 years of budget reforms, we probably should face 
up to the prospect that budget reforms are unlikely to 
produce major changes in budget outcomes. […] Bear in mind 
that not all budget reformers are trying to change budgetary 
outcomes in general. Reformers may be trying to improve the 
quality of budgetary decisions […] direct greater attention to 
budgetary matters such as evidence of program impact […] or 
provide officials with better information. These reformers may 
be less likely to be disappointed in the results of their efforts 
[…] (Nice, 2002, p. 190–191). 
Budget reforms encounter operational problems including the 
need to develop a translation grid to distribute budget data across 
government agencies and departments and consistently projecting 
cost data into the future. Also, “Strong bureaucratic overtones can be 
anticipated in the need to bring meaning and reason to the 
aggregation of program components presently implemented in 
different organizational units” (Anshen, 1969, pp. 21–22). 
Historically, “governmentwide PPB […] proved much more difficult to 
‘crossover’ between departments than to reconcile organizational 
problems within the same agency” (Schick, 1973, p. 152). 
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A final consideration is the role of Congress in this process. 
Observing the demise of PPB across the government, Schick found 
“Congress generally preferred to continue its accustomed ways, and 
the appropriations committee took little note of efforts to change the 
budget process” (Schick, 1973, p. 154). However, in practice, the 
President’s budget largely defines congressional decision making on 
budgets and appropriations. “While Congress does have the final 
authority, the executive branch can and does exert powerful 
pressures on the Congress. The sheer magnitude and complexity of 
the executive budget itself limits congressional power over it. Despite 
the wide publicity frequently given changes made by the Congress in 
the budget presented by the President, important alterations are 
usually few and minor” (Steiner, 1965, p. 13). 
Budget structure has the potential for reflecting policy decision in 
decisions about resource allocation. Similarly, program budgeting is 
designed to assemble budget data for decisions based on program 
purposes, operations and performance. Neither, however, represents 
certainty in the implementation of policy changes. Past practices 
often prevail despite process or structural change and successful 
implementation of program budgeting has met with significant 
obstacles. Notwithstanding this mixed review of budget reform, 
influential individuals and groups are arguing for a coordinated, 
consolidated transparent whole of government national security 
budget to support a new national security portfolio.  An understanding 
of budgeting potential and limitations informs the debate, as would 
an exploration of how such a budget reform could be operationalized. 
Building a National Security Budget 
What constitutes national security and what elements of federal 
departments and agencies might rightly be included in an integrated 
national security budget?  The PNSR 2008 report observed, “There is 
no agreement on which parts of an agency budget should be included 
in an integrated national security budget; a process for even making 
this determination does not exist” (Project on National Security 
Reform, 2008, p. 47). PNSR suggested three categories of 
organizations in national security: (1) core national security 
institutions that spend the preponderance of their time on national 
security activities; (2) organizations that do not spend the 
preponderance of their time on national security but which have 
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some mission-specific national security roles; and (3) organizations 
that do not have standing national security roles but which might be 
required to do contingency planning and develop capabilities for 
exceptional cases. (Project on National Security Reform, 2008, pp. 
395–396). To examine the recommendations for a national security 
budget in greater detail, we looked at the question of how such a 
budget could be built based on organizational, programmatic and 
functional approaches.  We then attempted to construct such 
notional national security budgets. 
Organization-based Budgets 
Tables 1 and 2, in an organizational approach, display the 
budgets of different combinations of departments, agencies and 
activities that could constitute whole of government national 
security.2 First, the total discretionary budgets of the statutory 
departmental members of the NSC and HSC are aggregated. The 
results of this are shown in Table 1. It aligns with recommendations 
to merge the NSC and HSC for national security activities.  However, it 
leaves out other agencies that engage in national security activities. 
Moreover, reporting the total budgets of these agencies overstates a 
national security budget because these departmental and agency 
budgets may include significant amounts of spending for non-security 
programs.  Nevertheless, identifying them for more integrated 
national security budgeting is a first step.   
 
TABLE 1 
 National Security Budget by NSC/HSC Department and Agency: FY 
2008 (In $ Millions) 
Agencies Budget 
Department of Defense 515,540 
Department of Homeland Security 37,611 
Department of State 39,213 
Department of the Treasury 12,461 
Department of Justice 23,426 
Department of Health and Human Services 68,487 
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TABLE 2 
National Security Budget by Department and Agency Involved in National 
Security: FY 2008 (In $ millions) 
Agencies Budgets 
Department of Defense 515,540 
Department of Homeland Security 34,900 
Department of State 32,900 
Department of the Treasury 12,461 
Department of Justice/FBI 22,700 
Department of Health and Human Services 71,900 
Department of Transportation 15,500 
Intelligence Community NA* 
U.S. Agency for International Development 630 
Department of Agriculture 21,800 
Department of Commerce 6,900 
Department of Energy 23,900 
Environmental Protection Agency 7,500 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 3,900 
Export-Import Bank 1 
NASA 17,200 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1,020 
Peace Corps 343 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation 165 
Federal Communications Commission 437 
Executive Office of the President  
Office of the Vice President 4 
Office of Management and Budget 78 
U.S. Trade Representative 46 
Council of Economic Advisors 4 
Office of Science and Technology Policy 5 
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board NA* 
National Security Council 9 
Total 789,845 
Notes: * Classified.  
 
To attempt a more comprehensive array of national security 
budgeting, the budgets of the twenty-seven departments and 
agencies identified in the 2008 PNSR report, as referenced in the 
2006 National Security Strategy (Project on National Security Reform, 
2008, p. 393), are aggregated. This array is displayed in Table 2. This 
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budget array better displays the scope and breadth of national 
security activities throughout the federal government. The number of 
departments, agencies and offices clearly goes well beyond those 
traditionally considered in national security. But simply aggregating 
their total budgets overstates the U.S. national security budget even 
more than in Table 1 because these budgets also involve non-security 
spending. While helpful in broadening understanding of the scope of 
national security activity, this approach is somewhat unwieldy and 
using those combined budgets as a national security budget distorts 
fiscal reality. 
Program-based Budget 
If organizational-based budgeting for national security is not 
satisfying, could a program-based budget be more useful? The FY 
2008 budgets and annual performance reports of the major cabinet 
departments and agencies were examined to identify specific 
programs and activities self-identified as related to national security 
or which otherwise appeared to relate to national security. From this 
data a more detailed integrated whole of government US national 
security budget for FY 2008 was constructed (Table 3). The results 
indicate the difficulty of this approach. Marginal decisions about 
which individual programs to include in national security are difficult;  
 
TABLE 3 
 National Security Budget by Selected Programs: FY 2008 (In $ Millions) 




Department of State* State and USAID Bilateral Economic 
Assistance 
20,266 
State International Organizations 2,461 
State Administration of Foreign Affairs 7,194 
Department of Justice National Security Division 78 
FBI National Security 40 
FBI National Security Analytic Capabilities 11 
FBI Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Directorate 
18 
FBI Computer Analysis Response Teams 22 
FBI Render Safe Mission 11 
FBI Data Intercept and Access Program 37 
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
 Departments Sub-Departments Budget 
 FBI National Virtual Translation Center 3 
Department of Interior Energy Security for the Nation 481 
Department of 
Agriculture 
Foreign Agricultural Service 4,573 
Food and Agriculture Defense Initiative 341 
Avian influenza       57 
Iraq Provincial Reconstruction 12 
Renewable Energy 405 
Department of 
Commerce 
International Trade Administration 417 
National Weather Service 799 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Research 336 
National Environmental Satellite, Data and 
Information Service 
152 
Department of Labor 
 
Office of Inspector General (Work Permits) 468 
Foreign Labor Certification Processing 65 
Department of Health 
and Human Services 
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
Control 
75 
Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention 
10,124 
Food and Drug Administration 2,100 
Department of 
Transportation 
Federal Aviation Administration 14,077 
Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety 
Administration 
119 
Maritime Administration 295 
Department of Energy Uranium Enrichment D&D Fund 573 
Uranium Sales and Remediation Science 4 
Nuclear Waste Disposal 202 
National Nuclear Security Administration 9,386 




Other Independent Department and Agencies 
Bilateral Assistance 
4,373 
International Financial Institutions 1,498 
International Organizations and Programs 289 




Notes: * Not including supplemental appropriations  
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perhaps also political and subjective. Moreover, extracting individual 
programs from their organizational context presents practical 
difficulties and might be subject to budgetary gamesmanship. 
Nevertheless, Table 3 closely represents a whole of government 
approach to national security budgeting. 
Function-based Budget 
To address the shortcomings of organizational and programmatic 
budgets for national security, another budget was created utilizing the 
existing OMB budget function structure. OMB arrays the federal 
budget using functional categories that group together items which 
are functionally related, regardless of the agency that is responsible. 
“Budget function classifications are intended to provide a means of 
arraying budget data according to the major functions served” 
(General Accounting Office, 1998, p. 2). Function classifications 
describe national needs. “These functions include all spending for a 
given topic, regardless of the federal agency that oversees the 
individual federal program” (US House of Representatives, Committee 
on the Budget, 2010). Sub-function classifications represent 
resources devoted to agency missions. “Subfunctions are the building 
blocks of functions […] with each intended to describe discrete but 
related groupings of programs and activities” (General Accounting 
Office (GAO), 1998, p. 3). Today, OMB utilizes twenty-one budget 
functions and numerous budget sub-functions under each to develop 
the President’s budget.  The Congressional budget committees use 
them in developing the concurrent budget resolution. “Modern 
budget function classifications have evolved from a structure first 
used in 1948. […] This period saw significant change in the use of 
budget functions from a purely retrospective summary of federal 
spending, to a supplemental but subsidiary presentation summarizing 
the President’s budget submission, to the basic prospective 
framework for the modern congressional budget resolution” (GAO, 
1998, p. 1). The twenty-one budget functions are listed in Table 4. 
O’Hanlon examined changes to national security spending 
accomplished by shifts among budget functions, identifying changes 
in FY 2010 national security spending by the Obama administration: a 
reduction of $9.2 billion in the national defense (050) budget 
function  and increases of $2.7 billion for homeland security 
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TABLE 4 
Federal Budget Functions 
050 National Defense 550 Health 
150 International Affairs 570 Medicare 
250 General Science, Space, 
Technology 
600 Income Security 
270 Energy 650 Social Security 
300 Natural Resources, Environment 700 Veterans Benefits and 
Services 
350 Agriculture 750 Administration of Justice 
370 Commerce, Housing Credit 800 General Government 
400 Transportation 900 Net Interest 
450 Community and Regional 
Development 
920 Allowances 
500 Education, Training, Employment 
and Social Services 
950 Undistributed Offsetting 
Receipts 




   
accounts and $7.3 billion for budget function 150 (State department 
and foreign assistance agencies) (O’Hanlon, 2009, pp. 8–9). He goes 
on to propose more shifting between budget functions that is “more 
or less budget neutral, adding roughly as much to 150 and homeland 
security as it takes from 050” (O’Hanlon, 2009, p. 145). 
As an alternative to shifting resources between budget functions 
the approach here involves changing the title of the 050 budget 
function from national defense to national security and reassembling 
national security-related budget sub-functions across the government 
from their existing functional categories into the revised 050 budget 
function category.   
Refining budget functions by altering subfunctions is not 
uncommon. Both OMB and GAO have reassembled budget functions 
for analytical purposes. OMB developed six composites of functional 
totals called “superfunctions,” (one of which is “national defense”) 
and GAO constructed seven federal “mission areas” based on 
subfunctions (one of which is “national security and international 
affairs”) (GAO, 1998, pp. 11–12). Though budget functions have 
remained very stable over the years, this stability “masks more 
frequent changes that have occurred within subfunctions. Since 
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1979 OMB has tried to use subfunctions to more discretely portray 
the missions of the federal government” (GAO, 1998, p. 9). 
Utilizing budget functions would appear to satisfy the Center for 
American Progress recommendation for a unified national security 
budget that could support concurrent appropriations bills and a 
unified security funding analysis. It is also consistent with the PNSR 
recommendation for an executive budget review process to “identify 
the resources needed to achieve the national security strategy 
objectives and the tradeoffs necessary to provide those resources 
within overall federal budget constraints” (Project on National 
Security Reform, 2008, p. 404). No organizational changes are 
required, but OMB would now have visibility over a more integrated 
national security budget function. Like O’Hanlon’s security budget, 
this approach is budget neutral, taking as much from other budget 
functions as it is adding to 050 (O’Hanlon, 2009). The resulting array 
of a national security budget function is shown in Table 5.   
 
TABLE 5 
 National Security Budget by Budget Function and Sub-Function: FY 
2008 (In $ millions) 
Function Sub-Function Budget 
050 National Defense DoD Military 581,022 
DoE Atomic Energy Defense Activities 16,655 
DoJ (FBI) 3,476 
Other 2,535 
150 International Affairs International Development and 
Humanitarian Assistance   
15,837 
International Security Assistance 9,277 
250 General Science, 
Space and Technology 
DHS Science and Technology Programs 830 
400 Transportation Surface Transportation Security 40 
Air Transportation Security 2,949 
550 Health DHS Public Health Preparedness 5 
DHS Biodefense Countermeasures 
Acquisition 
500 
700 Veterans Benefits 
and Services 
 
DVA Hospital and Medicare Care for 
Veterans 
37,810 
DVA Veterans Education, Training and 
Rehabilitation 
2,883 
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TABLE 5 (Continued) 
 Function Sub-Function Budget 
750 Administration of 
Justice 
Border and Transportation Security 15,190 
970 Overseas 




Note: Figures may not add due to rounding. 
 
ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Arguments for a whole of government approach to national 
security include recommendations for a coordinated and integrated 
approach to budgeting for national security. Budget theory suggests 
that an integrated budget may facilitate tradeoffs in the budget 
development process and assist in identifying and evaluating national 
security programs. Budget research suggests that neither budget 
structure nor program budgeting provides the complete answer to 
policy decisions. The budgetary question is addressed here because 
it is central to the recommendations made by PNSR and the Center 
for American Progress. At the outset, these recommendations seem 
focused primarily on creating an organization-based national security 
budget. An examination of two organization-based budgets indicates 
that this is not as useful as it appears. Organizational-based budgets 
overstate the national security budget by including non-security 
activities. Nevertheless, they offer a good starting point. To further 
refine a national security budget a program-based budget was 
attempted.  Properly identifying programs to include in a national 
security budget proved challenging. Lastly, a budget based on re-
ordering OMB budget functions and sub-functions was attempted. 
This approach utilizes existing budget formats and processes to 
facilitate a whole of government approach to national security.  
Though the focus here is on the executive budget, OMB’s budget 
functions also align with the process used by Congress to assemble 
its annual budget resolution. 
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OBSERVATIONS 
Some more general observations can be made from this 
discussion of national security budgeting. First, depending on what 
agencies or programs are included, it appears that total U.S. national 
security spending could be as much as 20–50 percent higher than 
national defense spending alone. The DoD has the largest share and, 
given the constraints on the overall budget’s top line, it does not 
necessarily follow that national security budgets will increase as a 
result. Instead, it seems likely that increases in non-DoD security 
spending might well come from the DoD budget. If DoD and Secretary 
Gates are serious in arguing for non-DoD agencies to be more fully 
resourced for national security activities, they likely will need to be 
prepared to pay the bill. 
Second, determining what departments, agencies and programs 
should be included in the integrated national security policy domain is 
an inexact science. The budgets above display agencies and activities 
that more or less clearly carry a national security label. But some may 
argue persuasively that other issues (trade, immigration, 
environment, the economy) are also national security concerns and 
should also receive priority attention. Even among programs 
identified as related to national security, some may not be perceived 
as such (developmental programs, cultural exchanges, humanitarian 
aid, etc.) while others might argue that they are inherently part of the 
strategic communications portfolio of national security strategy.  
There are also activities which are not easily subject to budget 
transparency—some intelligence activities, for instance. 
Third, creating a national security budget may have implications 
for the budget processes used by agencies involved in national 
security. DoD’s long and complex budget process utilizes a much-
revised version of the planning-programming-budget-execution 
system (PPBES).  To the extent that other agencies will need to 
engage in longer-range planning and align program decisions with 
national security strategies, some form of program budgeting may be 
required of them as well.  
Finally, creating a national security budget can give greater clarity 
to U.S. policy and spending priorities. The share of the total budgetary 
pie for national security would be larger than is currently displayed for 
national defense alone, and the relative share for non-security 
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discretionary programs is smaller than more conventional portrayals 
of defense/non-defense budget splits. This could result in even 
greater budgetary stress for non-security domestic discretionary 
programs but it is not necessarily a predicate for larger security 
budgets. And, of course, the large amount of funding in an expanded 
050 budget function could make it a target as a source of funds for 
deficit reduction or to fund non-defense discretionary programs. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue of budgeting for national security has been examined to 
determine if spending could be arrayed in ways that would portray a 
more holistic fiscal picture of national security than is possible using 
current budget presentations. This inquiry is in response to proposals 
from analysts, practitioners and policy makers for a broader and more 
integrated approach to national security policy. Making and 
implementing national security policy requires making resource 
allocation decisions.  Korb, Duggan and Conley (2009) assert, 
“currently no single official document links strategy and resources for 
national security, which makes it difficult to establish priorities, 
identify redundancies and inefficiencies, and make trade-offs among 
the various tools in the nation’s national security portfolio” (p. 37). A 
whole of government integrated unified national security budget 
could facilitate the fiscal trade-offs required between alternative 
means of pursuing national security objectives and provide for both 
budgetary transparency and program accountability.  
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NOTES 
1. An earlier version of this paper was presented as the Towsley 
Foundation Policymaker-in-Residence Lecture, Gerald R. Ford 
School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 
November 2, 2009. 
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2. FY 2008 data from the FY 2009 President’s Budget is used 
because the data is complete and the budgetary distortions 
caused by the economic recovery programs of FY 2009 are not 
present.   
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